Hollins University

Hollins Digital Commons
Ann B. Hopkins Papers

Manuscript Collections

7-5-1990

No. 90-7099 Opposition to Motion for Summary Affirmance
United States Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.hollins.edu/hopkins-papers
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons

•

•

•

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

ANN B. HOPKINS,

Appel lee,
v.
PRICE WATERHOUSE,

Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 90-7099

OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary affirmance in
conjunction with her opposition to Price Waterhouse's emergency
motion for stay of the District Court's May 25, 1990 Title VII
judgment in this case.

In that motion, plaintiff argued that

the merits of this appeal are so "clear" that this Court should
affirm the judgment of the District Court without the benefit
of briefing, oral argument and deliberation.

But plaintiff's

arguments against full judicial scrutiny of the difficult legal
and factual issues presented by this case do not begin to meet
the Court's standard for summary affirmance.
The District Court imposed liability on Price
Waterhouse despite overwhelming evidence that plaintiff's
partnership candidacy was deferred because she was abusive to
subordinates, not because of her sex.

The District Court's

remedy is unprecedented in Title VII jurisprudence:

to compel

Price Waterhouse to make plaintiff a partner in the Price
Waterhouse firm.

The partnership was ordered in the face of an

express finding that plaintiff's own "unreasonable intentional
conduct •
partner.

removed any possibility" that she would be made
The District Court determined that it was bound by

the law of the case to a vacated opinion by this Court that
was, in turn, based on an erroneous reading of the District
Court's earlier findings.

These and other aspects of this case

raise difficult, substantial, and manifestly important
questions of first impression.

Moreover, this Court's grant of

Price Waterhouse's request for a stay of the judgment and its
order that the appeal be expedited effectively render moot any
theoretical or practical justifications for invocation of the
extraordinary and rare summary disposition procedure. 1 /
Plaintiff's request for summary affirmance must therefore be
denied.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000e, tl seq.

Plaintiff Ann B.

Hopkins contends that defendant's 1983 decision deferring for

1/ ~ June 29, 1990 Order. Appellant's Brief and Appendix
are due July 18, 1990; appellee's brief is due August 8, 1990;
appellant's reply is due August 15, 1990; and oral argument is
scheduled for September 7, 1990. Id.
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..
one year her candidacy for admission to the Price Waterhous e
partnersh ip was based upon considera tions of sex.

She has

sought an order requiring her admission to the partnersh ip,
back pay and attorney' s fees.
In its initial decision in 1985, after a nonjury
trial, Hopkins v. Price Waterhous e, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1114
(D.D.C. 1985), the District Court found that plaintiff 's
•conduct provided ample justificat ion for the complaint s that
formed the basis [for defendan t's] decision. •

There were

legitimate , nonpretex tual bases for deferring her partnersh ip
candidacy .

Plaintiff was •assertiv e, overly critical of

others, impatient with her staff,• idi. at 1114, •overly
aggressiv e, unduly harsh, difficult to work with• and generally
abusive to subordina tes.

J.d. at 1113.

These views were shared

by Price Waterhous e partners and staff, and plaintiff admitted
their validity.

I,d.

The District Court found that Price

Waterhous e "had every reason and legal right to come down hard
on abrasive conduct in men or women seeking partnersh ip.•

Id.

at 1120.
Neverthel ess, the court found that Price Waterhous e
had permitted an unquantif ied level of •unconscio us• sexual
stereotypi ng to play an "undefined role• in its decisionm aking
process .

.Id. at 1118.

The District Court concluded that

because Price Waterhous e had not proven by •clear and
convincing evidence that the decision [to defer plaintiff 's
candidacy for one year] would have been the same absent

-
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discrimination," id. at 1120, Price Waterhouse had violated
Title VII.Z/
In August 1987, this Court affirmed the District
Court's decision as to liability "[b]ecause Price Waterhouse
could not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence" that it
would have made the same decision deferring plaintiff's
partnership candidacy irrespective of her gender.

Hopkins v.

Price Waterhouse. 825 F.2d 458, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1987).~/
On May 1, 1989, the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed the decision of this Court.
Hopkins, 109

s.

Ct. 1775 (1989).

Price Waterhouse v.

The Court held that "an

employer shall not be liable if it can prove [by a
preponderance of the evidence] that, even if it had not taken
gender into account, it would have come to the same decision
regarding a particular person."

.Id. at 1786.

The Supreme

Court reversed the judgment of liability against Price

11

When plaintiff came up for partnership consideration the
following year, she was not reproposed. The District Court
ruled that Price Waterhouse's decision not to repropose
plaintiff for partner the subsequent year was
nondiscriminatory. Id. at 1115. That finding was not
appealed. As will be discussed in more detail, infra. the
District Court reaffirmed on remand that the decision not to
repropose plaintiff for partnership was not discriminatory and,
indeed, found that it was caused by plaintiff's own
unreasonable conduct.

~/ Judge Williams dissented from the panel's holding affirming
liability, observing that "the record here provided no causal
connection between Hopkins' fate and [sexual]
stereotyping . . . • " 825 F.2d at 474 (Williams, J.,
dissenting).

- 4 -

Waterhouse and remanded the case for further proceedings
because this Court and the District Court had "erred by
deciding that the defendant must make this proof by clear and
convincing evidence • • • • "

l.d. at 1795.

In an August 1,

1989 order, this Court vacated its 1987 mandate and remanded to
the District Court for further proceedings.
Upon remand and after additional briefing and
argument, the District Court ruled that Price Waterhouse "ha[d]
not met its burden" under the preponderance of the evidence
standard and therefore was liable under Title VII.

Finding of

Fact and Conclusions of Law on Remand ("Findings on Remand"),
at 11 (May 14, 1990).

In determining the appropriate remedy,

the court below concluded that it ' had statutory authority under
Title VII to order Price Waterhouse to admit plaintiff to the
professional partnership and that such an order was an
appropriate exercise of its discretion in this case.
16, 19.

l.d. at

The District Court also ruled that, although plaintiff

had failed to mitigate damages, she was entitled to back pay
for the period July 1, 1984 through June 30, 1990.
The District Court entered its final order and
judgment on May 25, 1990 requiring Price Waterhouse, inter
~ ' to admit plaintiff into the partnership on July 1, 1990
and to pay plaintiff back pay in the amount of $371,175 and
reasonable attorney's fees.

May 25, 1990 Remedial Order.

On

June 21, 1990, Price Waterhouse timely filed its Notice of
Appeal and Motion for Stay in the District Court.

-
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The District

Court denied Price Waterhouse's request for a stay on June 25,
1990, "except as to attorney fees."
On June 29, 1990, this Court granted Price
Waterhouse's request for a stay of the partnership order and
back pay award and expedited the appeal.

ARGUMENT
A.

Facts and Findings Below and the Standards Applicable
to Motions for Summary Affirmance,
"Price Waterhouse is a partnership that specializes in

providing auditing, tax and management consulting services
primarily to private corporations and government
agencies • .

Its partners are certified public accountants

and other specialists."

618 F. Supp. at 1111.

Notwithstanding

its size, "Price Waterhouse has consistently sought to maintain
the traditional characteristics of a professional partnership
both in its management and partnership selection practices."

Price Waterhouse's decision in 1983 to "hold" or defer
plaintiff's partnership candidacy was a response by firm
partners to plaintiff's serious deficiencies in interpersonal
relationships, particularly in dealing with subordinates.

The

District Court found that interpersonal skills and respect and
decency toward staff and subordinates were "properly an
important part of Price Waterhouse's written partnership
evaluation criteria."

Id. at 1114.

-

6 -

The inability to get along

with staff or peers was •a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for refusing to admit a candidate to partnership.•

Id.

Plaintiff received more •no• votes on her candidacy
than 85 of the 88 candidates in 1983.

Id. at 1116.

Nearly

two-thirds of the partners that commented on plaintiff on the
basis of direct experience with her had criticisms of her
manner, style and relationships with subordinates.
Ex. 27.

~

Def.

Price Waterhouse candidates, male and female, are

•regularly held because of concerns about their interpersonal
skills . .

• 618 F. Supp. at 1116.

The partnership •takes

any evaluations recommending denial of partnership or a
negative reaction on this basis very seriously . • •

The

firm"s practice of giving 'no' votes great weight treated male
and female candidates in the same way.•

.Ig.

The "hold" decision was not a final rejection.

It

gave plaintiff a legitimate and fair opportunity to become a
Price Waterhouse partner:
There is little reason to believe the hold
was a cynical gesture; 16 of the 19
candidates placed on hold with Ms. Hopkins
in 1983 made partner in 1984, and in her
case the decision to hold her over appears
to have been a considered business
decision that her talent justified giving
her candidacy another look. It is clear
from the record that she was given a
genuine chance to demonstrate her ability
to overcome her differences in interpersonal relationships.
Findings on Remand, at 24-25.

-

7 -

But plaintiff sabatoged her own "genuine chance" for a
Price Waterhouse partnership.

The District Court twice found

that defendant's decision not to repropose plaintiff for
partner the following year was not discriminato ry.
Supp. at 1115.

618 F.

In fact, the District Court found that

plaintiff's "unreasonabl e intentional conduct" (Findings on
Remand, at 23), which consisted of misleading statements and
misrepresent ations, "removed any possibility that she would be
accepted as a partner" after the initial "hold" decision •

.Id.

at 25.
The District Court found that certain comments about
plaintiff that antedated the "hold" decision may have been
•tainted by unarticulate d, unconscious assumptions related to
sex.•

618 F. Supp. at 1118.

Thus, although "it is impossible

to label any particular negative reaction as being motivated by
intentional sex stereotyping ,• id., the District Court held
that those impermissibl e ingredients "combined to produce
discriminatio n" in this case •

.Id. at 1120.

On remand, the District Court was asked to re-evaluate
the evidence under the lower preponderanc e of the evidence
standard.

The court found unpersuasive defendant's arguments

that the nature, depth, diversity and intensity of the
criticism leveled at plaintiff by partners and her peers and
acknowledged by herself, and the evidence accepted by the court
in the first trial that males with similar personality problems
had also been "held" established by a preponderanc e of the

-
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evidence that Price Waterhouse would have deferred the
partnership of plaintiff, or any candidate with a similar
record, regardless. of sex.

Thus, the court not only required

Price Waterhouse to prove that it would have rejected plaintiff
regardless of her sex, but allowed the speculation of
plaintiff's expert to disqualify as potentially tainted every
criticism of plaintiff's •conduct• in the first trial that the
court had earlier found provided •ample justification• for the
decision.

In short, even though plaintiff was unable even to

identify a single comment as tainted, her expert's view that
some of the comments might have been tainted was allowed by the
court below to obliterate every legitimate criticism of
plaintiff's behavior.

~

Findings on Remand, at 6-11.

The District Court ordered Price Waterhouse to make
plaintiff a partner in the firm effective July 1, 1990.

During

the trial, the court below acknowledged that ordering a
partnership in a professional firm was an unprecedented Title
VII remedy:
I now am confronted with whether or not I'm
going to exercise my discretion as a judge
to be the first federal judge ever to put
somebody into a partnership and I want to
tell you that that's a difficult decision.
1990 Tr. at 250 (emphasis added).

Indeed, no federal court has

ever decreed a professional partnership as a Title VII remedy.
The circumstances of this case make it manifestly
ill-suited for summary disposition.

-
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The extraordinary summary

procedure is generally invoked only in cases in which no issue
of disputed fact exists,!/ where an •uncomplicated legal
issue [is] to be decided in an area where the case law is well
developed,• 21 or the appeal involves a nonfinal judgment in
an ongoing proceeding.~/

The •exacting standards• 21

governing summary disposition of appeals in this Circuit are
well settled.

"Because of the serious consequences that flow

from granting summary disposition, the court imposes on a party
a 'heavy burden.••

who requests summary affirmance •

United States v. Glover, 731 F.2d 41, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per
curiam) (quoting United States v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1287, 1288
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam)).

The movant must demonstrate

that the merits •are so clear• that "plenary briefing, oral
argument, and the traditional collegiality of the decisional
process would not affect [the Court's] decision• and are
therefore unnecessary.

Sills v. Bureau of Prisons, 761 F.2d

~/ See. e_._g_._, United States v. Glover, 731 F.2d 41, 45 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley.
819 F.2d 294 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (summarily affirming
order granting summary judgment); Walker v. Washington, 627
F.2d 541 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (summarily affirming
order granting summary judgment).
2/ Glover, 731 F.2d at 45; s e e , ~ , Dornan v. United States
Secretary of Defense, 851 F.2d 450, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per
curiam) (summarily affirming and applying •clear[] law of this
circuit").

~/ See. e_._g_._, Ambach v. Bell, 686 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(per curiam) (review of preliminary injunction).

2/ Federal Election Comm'n v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1092 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).
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792, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Glover, 731 F.2d at 44; Parker v.
Lewis. 670 F.2d 249, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam)
(correctne ss of district court's decision must be "totally free
from doubt" to permit summary affirmanc e).

In addition, a

party seeking summary affirmanc e must convince the Court that
"the need for speedy resolution of [the] appeal," Glover, 731
F.2d at 45, and the unique and special "circumst ances of the
case," Ambach v. Bell, 686 F.2d 974, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
justify preempting the ordinary appellate process.

None of

these factors exist in this case.
B.

This Case Presents Difficult , Serious and Novel
Questions for Appeal.
As Price Waterhous e demonstra ted in its Emergency

Motion for Stay, at 10-16, and its Reply, at 3-6, the District
Court's judgment raises substanti al and important issues
relating to the interpret ation and applicatio n of Title VII.
1.
Erroneous .

The District Court's Liability Finding is Clearly
The District Court's liability finding on remand

creates factual and legal issues that are complex and unique.
Although the court below on remand purported to apply the "less
exacting" preponder ance of the evidence standard of proof, it
character ized Price Waterhous e's burden as "a difficult task of
proof."

Findings on Remand, at 11.

Notwithst anding that the

District Court had earlier found that "it is impossibl e to
label any particula r negative reaction [to plaintiff 's

-
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interpersonal skills] as being motivated by intentional sex
stereotyping,• 618 F. Supp. at 1118, the District Court
concluded on remand that Price Waterhouse was required "to
separate out those comments tainted by sexism from those free
of sexism,• Findings on Remand, at 10, and was required somehow
to "identify each stereotyped negative comment.•

.Id. at 9.

The District Court allowed speculation to trump hard evidence
and then faulted Price Waterhouse for failing to disprove that
which plaintiff had found it impossible to prove.

The Supreme

Court's mandate cannot possibly be construed to have imposed
such a "difficult" and "impossible" task upon Price Waterhouse
on remand.
Moreover, although the record contains substantial
evidence that Price Waterhouse often "held" male candidates who
manifested interpersonal skills problems similar to
plaintiff's, the District Court did not mention, and does not
even appear to have considered, that proof in its analysis on
remand, even though this is seemingly precisely the kind of
"objective evidence" that the Supreme Court contemplated should
be considered in determining whether the firm had met its
burden on the "same decision" issue.

See 109 S. Ct. at 1791;

compare NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393,
396-97, 404 {1983) {when the "transgressions . • •

that

purportedly would have prompted [the] discharge were
commonplace, and no transgressor had ever before received any
kind of discipline," employer failed to meet burden of showing
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discharge would have occurred absent antiunion animus).

In

short, the District Court's interpretation of the Supreme
Court's mandate and its application of the preponderance of the
evidence standard in the sex stereotyping context present
perplexing questions in a new area of Title VII jurisprudence.
These questions warrant careful consideration by this Court.a/
2.

Partnership As a Title VII Remedy.

The question

whether federal courts have authority under Title VII to compel
individuals to form a partnership is an issue of first
impression.

The District Court itself acknowledged that

•whether the Court should force Price Waterhouse to make Ms.
Hopkins a partner presents a difficult and unresolved issue.•
Findings on Remand, at 16.
The District Court purported to rely upon the Supreme
Court's decision in Hishon v. King

&

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69

(1984), for authority to order partnership in this case.
However, the "narrow holding• (]Ji. at 78 n.10) in Hishon that
•in appropriate circumstances partnership consideration may
qualify as a term, condition, or privilege of a person's
employment" (emphasis added) for purposes of Title VII does not

a/ This Court has not hesitated to overturn district court
rulings in Title VII cases where, as here, the district court
has seriously misinterpreted the record. Compare Palmer v.
Baker, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 1458, 1461 (D.C. Cir.
May 11, 1990) (reversing district court's ruling that defendant
had not violated Title VII because the •district court's
conclusion . • . was based on a clearly erroneous
interpretation• of the evidence).

- 13 -

resolve the question of the power of courts under Title VII to
decide who shall be partners in a professional
relationship.~/

In a concurring opinion in Hishon, Justice

Powell observed that undue •impediments to the exercise of
one's right to choose one's associates can violate the right of
association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments,"l..Q./ i.d. at 80 n.4, and emphasized •that the
Court's opinion should not be read as extending Title VII to
the management of a law firm by its partners.

The reasoning of

the Court's opinion does not require that the relationship
among partners be characterized as an 'employment• relationship
to which Title VII would apply."

Id. at 79 (emphasis added).

The District Court's order would not only compel the creation
of a "relationship among partners,• but would also apparently

~/ The plaintiff in Hishon did not seek admission as a
partner. Therefore, the issue whether that remedy is
statutorily or constitutionally authorized was not before the
Court. See 467 U.S. at 72 (plaintiff "sought • . •
compensatory damages 'in lieu of reinstatement and promotion to
partnership.' This, of course, negates any claim for specific
performance of the contract alleged."); i_d. at 72-73 n.2; id.
at 80 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring) .
The Court in Hishon rejected the argument that the First
Amendment protected the right to engage in "'invidious private
discrimination.•• 467 U.S. at 78 (citation). However, Price
Waterhouse has made no such First Amendment claim. It contends
only that in light of the collegial, private nature of the
Price Waterhouse partnership, the First Amendment requires that
the least instrusive remedial alternative available be chosen.
Compare Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 303 &
n. 11 (1986) ("the fact that [associational rights] are
protected by the First Amendment requires that the procedure be
carefully tailored to minimize the infringement").

.l.Q./

-
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afford to the District Court permanent and continuing
jurisdiction over that relationship.ill

~ May 25, 1990

Remedial Order, at 2.
Title VII expressly applies only to "employment•
arrangements and makes "reinstatement or hiring of employees"
an available remedy.

42

u.s.c.

§ 2000e-5(g) (emphasis added).

There is nothing to suggest that Title VII was intended to
empower courts to transform simple employment relationships
into partnerships, or to order individuals to become partners
once their employment relationship has been terminatea. 121

11/ The courts have uniformly declined to extend federal
anti-discrimination statutes, including Title VII, to members
of professional partnerships. S e e , ~ , Burke v. Friedman,
556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977); see also Wheeler v. Main Hurdman,
825 F.2d 257, 263 (10th Cir.), .Q.e.I..t. denied, 484 U.S. 986
(1987).
ll/ The courts in equity historically have been reluctant to
compel the existence and continuation of personal
relationships. ~ , ~ , Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328,
335 (1897) (courts "will seldom, if ever, specifically
compel . . . performance of [a partnership] contract, the
contract of partnership being of an essentially personal
character•) (emphasis added); Marek v. McHardy. 234 La. 841,
101 So. 2d 689, 693 (1958) ("Manifestly, in a case like this
involving personal services coupled with a promise of the
obligees to make the plaintiff their business partner, the
court would not order the exceptional relief of specific
performance."); compare EEOC v. Kallir Phillips Ross. Inc., 420
F. Supp. 919, 926-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (denying reinstatement to
executive position because it "required a close working
relationship between plaintiff and top executives of defendant"
and "frequent personal contact with defendant's clients"),
aff'd without opinion, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert, denied,
434 U.S. 920 (1977); Hyland v. Kenner Products Co., 13 Fair
Empl. Prac. Case (BNA) 1309, 1321 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (rejecting
reinstatement of executive because "a person in an executive or
management position must have complete confidence of others in
management").

-
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~

Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 275-76 (10th Cir.),

.c..e..I.t.. denied. 484 U.S. 986 (1987).

("The requirement that

[Title VII and similar federal statutes] cover only employment
situations suggests that Congress perceived a need to limit the
application of these statutes.").

The District Court"s

decision wholly fails to "giv[e] effect to the meaning and
placement of the words chosen by Congress," Hughey v. United
States, No. 89-5691, slip op., at 6 (U.S. May 21, 1990), and
presents serious questions of statutory interpretation.
Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, Motion for Summ.
Aff., at 14-15, the 1987 decision of this Court did not
"indicat[e]

• that it viewed an offer of partnership as the

appropriate prospective relief" in this case.

Plaintiff's

assertion in that regard is most misleading.

The issue of

partnership admission was not tried, briefed, or argued in the
District Court in 1985 and therefore was not a question
presented for review in this Court or in the Supreme
Court.ll/

Thus, this Court has not had the opportunity to

deliberate and consider the merits of the indisputably
important question whether Title VII's equal employment

ll/ This Court correctly assumed in its 1987 opinion that the
District Court in the 1985 trial did not evaluate whether
partnership admission was an authorized or appropriate Title
VII remedy due to its holding that plaintiff voluntarily
resigned from the firm and was not "constructively
discharged." ~ 825 F.2d at 472-73. This Court reversed on
the constructive discharge issue and remanded the case to the
District Court for determination of the partnership admission
question in the first instance. 1_d. at 473.

-
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provisions empower courts to create nonemployrnen t relationships
such as partnerships , and, indeed, that question has not been
resolved by any other federal court.li/

It is an important

question of federal law that should be fully briefed and argued.
3.

Partnership As a Remedy in This Case.

Price

Waterhouse also contends that the District Court committed
reversible error when it ordered Price Waterhouse to admit
plaintiff as a partner under the peculiar facts of this case.
The court issued a partnership decree based upon the
"ill-defined theory of 'sex stereotyping ,'" Findings on Remand
at 32, despite evidence from most of the partners who evaluated
plaintiff that she did not pass a legitimate Price Waterhouse
criterion for partnership, that she was given a fair and
unbiased opportunity to correct her problems, that her own
"unreasonabl e intentional" conduct deprived her of any
"possibility " of making partner and that this process and these

14/ Other cases relied upon by plaintiff, Pl. Motion for Summ.
Aff., at 11-14, are simply inapposite. Lander v. Lujan, 888
F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1989), involved the reinstatemen t of a
federal civil service employee to "essentially the same job" as
he had previously held (id. at 158), a remedy that falls
squarely within the jurisdiction al strictures of Title VII.
Brown v. Trustees of Boston University1 891 F.2d 337 (1st Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3796 (June 19, 1990), affirmed
an order compelling promotion of an "assistant professor" to
"associate professor• with tenure. Such an order creates no
more than a long-term employment relationship . In University
of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 110 s. Ct. 577 (1990), the Supreme
Court simply suggested in dicta that partnerships are not
entitled to a special First Amendment privilege to withhold
partnership candidate review materials during discovery, a
proposition that is not at issue in this case.
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events, which were the actual cause of her not making partner,
were not discriminatory.

~

at 23-25.

Ordering a partnership

under such circumstances cannot reasonably be characterized as
an appropriate exercise of equitable discretion under Title
VII, even if the statute authorizes such relief.

4.

The District Court Erroneously Applied the Law of

the Case Doctrine.

The District Court ordered partnership

based on the assumption that it was bound by the law of the
case doctrine to a conclusion expressed in the previous Court
of Appeals' decision with respect to whether plaintiff had been
constructively discharged •

.Id. at 14.

But that remedial

decision was predicated upon a liability determination that was
overturned by the Supreme Court.

It was contained in an

o~inion by a panel of this Court that was vacated when this
case was remanded to the District Court.

And it was squarely

and unavoidably tied to the panel's erroneous reading of the
District Court's factual findings.

The District Court has now

made it clear beyond any room for argument that the damage
caused by the conduct found to be discriminatory consisted of
deferral of plaintiff's partnership candidacy for one year,
treatment likewise received by eighteen other candidates.

The

subsequent decision not to repropose plaintiff for partner,
which made it impossible for her to become a partner and which
was the basis of her decision to leave the firm, was the direct
and inescapable consequence of unreasonable and intentional
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acts by plaintiff and was not tainted in any way by
discriminatio n.

This Court, in its previous decision, surely

did not intend to find a constructive discharge under these
circumstance s.

But, in any event, the opinion that addressed

that subject has been vacated, is not the law of the case, and
cannot have compelled the District Court to adopt a conclusion
with which it did not agree.

c.

The Expedited Briefing Schedule Makes Summary
Disposition Wholly Unnecessary.
This Court's June 29, 1990 order establishing an

expedited briefing schedule conclusively resolves any claim
that summary disposition is necessary to effect "a speedy
resolution" of the appeal,~ Glover, 731 F.2d at 45, and
effectively moots plaintiff's request for summary treatment of
the merits.

Indeed, Price Waterhouse's opening brief is due

less than two weeks after the filing of this Opposition and a
complete appellate record will be available to the Court in
approximatel y 90 days.

See supra note 1.

Under such

circumstance s, invocation of summary procedures would be
duplicative and unnecessary.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff 's assertion that the foregoing issues are
"so clear" as to justify summary dispositio n is inexplicab le
and completel y unfounded .

Indeed, this Court's grant of a stay

of the judgment demonstra tes that the appeal presents
substanti al and important questions and that there is a
reasonable likelihood that Price Waterhous e will succeed on the
merits . .l.5./

It would therefore be inappropr iate and unjust to

resolve this case without engaging in the "collegia l
deliberat ive process" on appeal and in the absence of complete
briefing of the merits and oral argument pursuant to the
expedited briefing schedule.
(Mikva, J., dissentin g).

~

Glover, 731 F.2d at 52

The motion for summary affirmance

must be denied.

Dated:

July 5, 1990

Of Counsel:
Eldon Olson
General Counsel
Ulric R. Sullivan
Assistant General Counsel
PRICE WATERHOUSE
1251 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10020
(212) 489-8900

Respectfu lly submitted ,

4.kr~Q2~

(D.C. Bar No. 367456)
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr.
(D.C. Bar No. 420440)
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER
1050 Connectic ut Ave., N.
Suite 900
Washingto n, D.C. 20036
(202) 955-8500

w.

15/ To justify a stay Price Waterhous e was required to
demonstra te, inter alia, a "probabil ity of success on the
merits." Washingto n Area Metropoli tan Transit Commissio n v.
Holiday Tours, 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The motions
panel concluded that Price Waterhous e had met that standard.
SM June 29, 1990 Order.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby ce~tify that I caused a copy of the foregoin g
Opposit ion to Motion for Summary Affirma nce to be served by
hand delivery this 5th day of. auly 1990, upon James H. Heller,
Esq., Kator, Scott
Washing ton, D.C.

&

Heller, 1275 K Street, N.W., Suite 950,

20006.
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